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[Forthcoming in R. Sinclair (ed.). Science and Sensibilia by W. V. Quine: The 1980 Immanuel Kant Lectures] 
 
“Mental States are like Diseases” 






One of the great values of the Immanuel Kant Lectures is that it sheds new light on 
the nature of Quine’s views about behaviorism. Where Quine’s linguistic behaviorism 
is well-known, the Lectures contain one of his most detailed discussions of 
behaviorism in psychology and the philosophy of mind. Quine clarifies the nature of 
his psychological commitments by arguing for a view that is quite modest: he argues 
against ‘excessively restrictive’ variants of behaviorism while maintaining that ‘a 
good measure of behaviorist discipline is still needed to keep [our mental] terms 
under control’. In this paper, I use Quine’s comments in the Lectures to reconstruct 
his position. I start by distinguishing three types of behaviorism in psychology and the 
philosophy of mind: ontological behaviorism, logical behaviorism, and 
epistemological behaviorism. Next, I reconstruct Quine’s perspective on each of these 
views and argue that he does not fully accept any of them. Finally, I combine these 
perspectives and reconstruct Quine’s subtle view about behaviorism in psychology.  																																																								
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The nature of Quine’s commitment to behaviorism is perhaps best summarized by his 
slogan: “In psychology one may or may not be a behaviorist, but in linguistics one has 
no choice” (1987, 341; 1990, 37-8). Quine’s linguistic behaviorism is well known; 
throughout his career, he has extensively argued that language is a social art—that we 
can only acquire a language “by observing other people’s verbal behavior” and by 
having our “own faltering verbal behavior observed and reinforced or corrected by 
others” (ibid.). Quine’s linguistic behaviorism, in other words, tells us something 
about the data we have available in learning a language; ‘mental entities’, even if they 
exist, play no role in language acquisition.1 
Quine’s views about psychological behaviorism, on the other hand, seem less 
well defined. Not only because of his claim that ‘one may or may not be a 
behaviorist’ in psychology, but also because he has written remarkably little about 
issues in psychology and the philosophy of mind. In the first decades of his career, for 
example, Quine never publicly qualified his commitment to behaviorism beyond his 
views about language learning. Although it is widely recognized that it is a mistake to 
believe that Quine’s approach to language depends on a behaviorist approach to 
psychology (see, for example, Hylton 2007, 102), many scholars seem to assume that 
his views on mind and behavior were at the very least compatible with those of the 
behavioral psychologists. 
 One of the great values of the Immanuel Kant Lectures is that it sheds new 
light on the nature of Quine’s views about psychological behaviorism. “Mind and Its 
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Place in Nature”, the first lecture of the series, contains one of Quine’s most detailed 
discussions of topics and arguments that are mostly ignored in his published work. 
Quine clarifies the nature of his psychological commitments by arguing for a view 
that is quite modest: he argues against “excessively restrictive” variants of 
behaviorism while maintaining that “a good measure of behaviorist discipline is still 
needed to keep [our mental] terms under control” (p. 5). 
In this paper, I use Quine’s comments in the Lectures to reconstruct his 
position. I start by distinguishing three types of behaviorism in psychology and the 
philosophy of mind: ontological behaviorism, logical behaviorism, and 
epistemological behaviorism (section 2). Next, I reconstruct Quine’s perspective on 
each of these views and argue that he does not fully accept any of them (sections 3-5). 
Finally, I combine these perspectives and reconstruct Quine’s surprisingly subtle view 
about behaviorism in psychology. (section 6).  
 
 
2. Three types of behaviorism 
 
In order to disentangle Quine’s complex position about behaviorism in psychology, 
we need to distinguish between three types of behaviorism: ontological behaviorism, 
logical behaviorism, and epistemological behaviorism. Roughly speaking, these 
variants all reject psychological theories that appeal to mental entities (including folk-
psychological ‘theories’) and replace them with theories that redefine psychology as 
the study of behavior. The difference between these variants, however, is that they all 
rely on distinct arguments against mentalism; ontological behaviorists argue that 
mental entities do not exist, logical behaviorists argue that mental statements are 
meaningless if they cannot be translated into a physicalistic language, and 
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epistemological behaviorists maintain that mental states, images, and processes are 
explanatorily redundant. 
 Before I characterize these behaviorisms in more detail, it should be noted that 
my classification here is primarily conceptual; it mainly distinguishes between three 
arguments against mentalism. As a result, the positions sketched here are not mutually 
exclusive; it is possible to reject mentalism for more than one reason. Nor is my 
taxonomy intended to be complete. One branch of behaviorism I will not be 
discussing, for example, is methodological behaviorism; the view that mental states, 
even if they exist, cannot be studied because introspection is unreliable.2 Furthermore, 
because there are many ways to spell out the view that psychology is a science of 
behavior, there are countless variants of the views specified in this section. Indeed, 
most variants of behaviorism that have actually been defended by twentieth-century 
psychologists combine one or more of the arguments developed below with a specific 
positive proposal.3 The primary use of my taxonomy here is to separate between 
distinct arguments against what Quine calls “uncritical mentalism” (1970, 5) in order 
to obtain a more structured overview of the philosophical presuppositions that guide 
behaviorists in psychology. 
 Prima facie, ontological behaviorism is the most straightforward variant of 
behaviorism. To accept the ontological argument is simply to deny that mental entities 
exist. Although it will be quite difficult to convincingly argue that there are no mental 
entities without relying on epistemological considerations—ontological arguments are 
often epistemological arguments in disguise—the view itself seems to be reasonably 
clear-cut; psychologists cannot appeal to mental states, mental processes, and mental 
images because there are no such things. 
In practice, however, the situation is more complicated. Most psychologists 
and philosophers who dismiss mentalism on ontological grounds will not flatly deny 
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that mental entities exist. Rather, they will argue that mental entities are not what they 
seem to be. When Watson argues that “thought processes are really motor habits in 
the larynx” (1913, 177, my emphasis), for example, he is not denying that we do not 
think, he is reducing thinking to sensori-motor events; he is reducing mental states 
and processes to states and processes of a non-mental kind.  
Reduction is also the aim of the second type of behaviorism specified above: 
logical behaviorism. According to logical behaviorists, meaningful psychological 
statements either do not contain mental concepts or they can be translated into 
statements that do not contain mental concepts. In “The Logical Analysis of 
Psychology”, for example, Carl Hempel argues that any meaningful statement that 
contains a mental term can be translated without loss into a conjunction of all the 
physical test sentences which, if true, would verify that statement: 
 
the meaning of a proposition is established by the conditions of its 
verification. In particular, two differently formulated propositions have the 
same meaning or the same effective content when, and only when, they are 
both true or both false in the same conditions [….] Let us […] examine a 
proposition which involves a psychological concept, for example: “Paul has 
a toothache.” What is the specific content of this proposition […]? It will be 
sufficient to indicate some test sentences which describe these 
circumstances.  
a.  Paul weeps and makes gestures of such and such kinds.  
b.  At the question “What is the matter?”, Paul utters the words “I 
have a toothache”. 
c.  Closer examination reveals a decayed tooth with exposed pulp.  
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[…] The proposition in question, which is about someone’s “pain”, […] 
therefore […] can be re-translated without loss of content into a proposition 
which no longer contains the term “pain”, but only physical concepts. 
(Hempel 1935/1949, 377-8) 
 
A statement like “Paul has a toothache”, in other words, can be translated into a long 
conjunction of directly verifiable sentences about his tooth and his pain-related 
behavior.4   
Although both logical and ontological behaviorists aim to reduce the mental to 
the physical, logical behaviorism should not be considered to be a branch of 
ontological behaviorism. Where ontological behaviorists deny that mental entities 
exist, logical behaviorists aim to circumvent ontological questions by maintaining that 
statements containing mental concepts are either meaningless or abbreviations of 
statements that do not contain mental concepts. Or, as Hempel expresses it: 
 
Logical behaviorism claims neither that minds, feelings, inferiority 
complexes, voluntary actions, etc., do not exist, nor that their existence is in 
the least doubtful. It insists that the very question as to whether these 
psychological constructs really exist is already a pseudo-problem, since 
these notions in their ‘legitimate use’ appear only as abbreviations in 
physicalistic statements. (Hempel 1935/1949, 381). 
 
 Not all behaviorists worry about the verifiability of psychological statements 
however. In fact, many behaviorists accept some sort of distinction between the 
mental and the physical, or, at the very least, a distinction between states and 
processes that can be publicly observed and states and processes that can only be 
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observed privately. Where logical behaviorists maintain that all meaningful 
psychological statements are public, behaviorists like Skinner admit that “a small part 
of the universe is private” for every individual:  
 
The individual’s response to an inflamed tooth […] is unlike the 
response which anyone else can make to that particular tooth, since no 
one else can establish the same kind of contact with it. Events which 
take place during emotional excitement or in states of deprivation are 
often uniquely accessible for the same reason; in this sense our joys, 
sorrows, loves, and hates are peculiarly our own. (1953: 257) 
 
Instead, Skinner offers an epistemological argument against mentalism. 
According to Skinner, any appeal to mental states, processes, and images is 
explanatorily redundant: “The objection is not that these things are mental but that 
they offer no real explanation and stand in the way of a more effective analysis” 
(1969, 222).  To see why, consider again the case of Paul’s inflamed tooth. The claim 
that Paul is in pain, according to Skinner, does not even begin to explain why Paul 
exhibits the behavior listed by Hempel. Paul’s inner state—or better “inner 
behavior”—is not an explanans, it is itself an explanandum:  
 
When an example of maladjusted behavior is explained by saying that 
the individual is ‘suffering from anxiety,’ we have still to be told the 
cause of the anxiety. But the external conditions which are then invoked 
could have been directly related to the maladjusted behavior. Again, 
when we are told that a man stole a loaf of bread because ‘he was 
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hungry,’ we have still to learn of the external conditions responsible for 
the ‘hunger.’ These conditions would have sufficed to explain the theft. 
The objection to inner states is not that they do not exist, but that they 
are not relevant in a functional analysis. (Skinner 1953, 35) 
  
Epistemological behaviorism, in other words, simply claims that we do not require 
mental entities in explaining human and non-human behavior. For both our inner 
states and our outer behavior require an explanation in terms of external conditions. 
 
 
3. Radical reduction 
 
I have briefly distinguished three types of behaviorism: logical behaviorism, 
ontological behaviorism, and epistemological behaviorism. In what follows, I will 
answer the question whether and to what extent Quine accepts these views. 
Prima facie, there are some good reasons to suppose that Quine was 
committed to logical behaviorism—to the view that all psychological statements can 
be translated into statements that do not contain mental concepts. After all, one of the 
strongest arguments for logical behaviorism is the observation that we have all 
learned how to speak our language ‘by observing other people’s verbal behavior’ and 
by having our ‘own faltering verbal behavior observed and reinforced or corrected by 
others’. If language is a social art, as Quine maintains, why not assume that mental 
concepts are social too? Why not assume that our statements about toothaches can be 
reduced to sentences about the behavioral facts that we as a community rely on in 
teaching each other to talk about toothaches? Indeed, in some passages of the 
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Immanuel Kant Lectures, Quine seems to come close to this conclusion: 
 
Introspect our mental states as we will, how do we know what to call 
them? How did we learn to call our anxieties anxieties, our dull aches dull 
aches, our joys joys and our awareness awareness? Why do we suppose 
that what we call joys and anxieties are what other people call by those 
names? Clearly the answer is that such terms are applied in the light of 
publicly observable symptoms. (IKL, 2-3) 
 
If psychological statements are “socially inculcated and controlled” (1965, 50), in 
other words, it seems plausible to conclude that they do not depend on anything that 
cannot be discovered in publicly observable behavior. 
Still, it would be a mistake to view Quine as a logical behaviorist. For Hempel’s 
translation thesis is an example of ‘radical reductionism’, one of the two positivist 
commitments Quine rejects in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951a), the paper in 
which he famously argues that individual statements do not have any distinct empirical 
content of their own.  Against the view that every scientific hypothesis can be 
translated into a set of directly testable statements, Quine argues that only clusters of 
scientific hypotheses are testable—that “our statements about the external world face 
the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body” (p. 41). 
Interestingly, Hempel himself has played an important role in developing and 
popularizing Quine’s holism—offering a wide range of arguments against the strict 
translationism he professed in the early 1930s. It is therefore not surprising that 
Hempel too dismisses logical behaviorism in later stages of his career. Indeed, in a 
reprint of “The Logical Analysis of Psychology”, Hempel adds the following footnote:  
	 10	
 
I now (1947) consider the type of physicalism outlined in this paper as too 
restrictive; the thesis that all statements of empirical science are 
translatable, without loss of theoretical content, into the language of 
physics, should be replaced by the weaker assertion that all statements of 
empirical science are reducible to sentences in the language of physics, in 
the sense that for every empirical hypothesis, including, of course, those of 
psychology, it is possible to formulate certain test conditions in terms of 
physical concepts which refer to more or less directly observable physical 
attributes. But those test conditions are not asserted to exhaust the 
theoretical content of the given hypothesis in all cases. (1935/1949, 373n1) 
 
Instead of maintaining that psychological statements can be translated into a 
behavioral language, in other words, Hempel argues that a mental term can be 
partially defined by specifying the experimental conditions that have to obtain in order 
to find out whether or not the term applies.5 
Quine, however, rejects even Hempel’s weakened version of logical 
behaviorism. According to Quine, criteria that aim to reduce individual statements to 
sets of experimental conditions are still too strong. For many respectable physical 
concepts (e.g. ‘absolute temperature’ or ‘ 𝜓  function’) will resist any such 
interpretation. Where partial definitions aim to specify the necessary conditions for the 
application of a term, Quine shows that experimental test results will never strictly 
decide whether or not a certain disposition is present.6  
Given the connection between logical behaviorism and radical reductionism, we 




If […] in an access of behaviorism we were to refuse any mental states but 
what are supported by full behavioral criteria across the board, the physical 
status of the admitted ones would be secure. […] The physicalist could 
settle for the hypothetical physical basis and simply label it with the 
mentalistic term. However, this extreme of behaviorism would be 
excessively restrictive […] We do have to depend on behavioral criteria to 
legitimize and support the terms that we take over from the mental 
vocabulary, but that support is a matter of degree. (IKL, 4-5).  
 
Instead of claiming that the acceptability of a mental term depends on the question 
whether statements containing the term can be reduced to statements that only refer to 
outward behavior, Quine claims that the acceptability of a mental term depends on the 
question whether or not adopting the term contributes to our overall theory of the 
world. Indeed, in a paper entitled “Sellars on Behaviorism, Language, and Meaning” 
(written in the same year as the Immanuel Kant lectures), Quine makes exactly this 
point: 
 
Mentalistic predicates can be tolerated in the manner of theoretical 
predicates of physics, e.g. electron spin, or even electron. For them there is 
no observational criterion, except as these predicates contribute to the 
coherence and simplicity of an inclusive theory for which there is 
observational support as a whole. In a word, we can admit them as hidden 
variables.7 (1980a, 126) 
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Quine, in sum, is not a logical behaviorist. He rejects both translational and more 
loosely reductionist versions of the position. We can legitimately adopt a mental term 
if it contributes to our overall theory of the world; statements containing mental terms 
do not have to be explained away. 
Still, we began our discussion by noting that there seems to be a conceptual 
connection between logical behaviorism and Quine’s thesis that language is a social 
art. If Quine is not a logical behaviorist, then how does he combine his view about 
mental terms with his view about language learning? How can he maintain that we can 
only learn how to use a term like ‘toothache’ through ‘social emulation and social 
feedback’ and claim that statements containing the term ‘toothache’ cannot be reduced 
to statements about publicly observable behavior? 
Again, the Immanuel Kant Lectures provide the solution. Quine shows that 
although we initially learn a term by keying it to publicly observable behavior, we 
soon learn how to extrapolate these terms to situations that are not intersubjectively 
accessible: 
 
[Mental] terms are applied in the light of publicly observable channels and 
then extrapolated along private channels. Someone observes my joyful or 
anxious expression or perhaps observes my gratifying or threatening 
situation itself, or hears me tell about it. She then applies the word ‘joy’ or 
‘anxiety’. After perhaps another such lesson or two, I find myself applying 
those words to some of my subsequent states on the strength of a felt 
similarity. I thus take to reporting my joy or anxiety in cases where no 
outward signs are to be observed beyond my report itself. (IKL, 3) 
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Although we initially rely on publicly observable behavior in learning how to use 
mental predicates, in other words, we eventually go beyond such behavior because we 
‘extrapolate along private channels’. At some point, I notice that every time someone 
describes my behavior as anxious, I also privately experience a certain emotional 
disturbance; I can then extrapolate by describing myself as anxious in all situations in 
which I seem to experience a similar disturbance, even if in some of those situations 
there are no outward signs of my anxiety. 
Quine’s theory about mental predicates, in sum, recognizes two forces that pull 
in opposite directions: as long as mental predicates contribute to our theory as a whole, 
there is no problem if they are only “loosely anchored” to the publicly observable 
world. On the other hand, “a good measure of behaviorist discipline is still needed to 
keep the terms under control” (IKL, 5). Or, as Quine expresses it in an as of yet 
unpublished speech for psychologists, again written in the same year as the Immanuel 
Kant Lectures:  
 
The behavioral evidence need not be present on every occasion, but still 
we are well advised not to make free with mentalistic terms that are 
habitually beyond the control of behavioral criteria. This is where 
behaviorist discipline comes in. It is one point of strategy, and there is also 
a complementary point of strategy. As in any theoretical science, there can 
sometimes be occasion to posit a theoretical force or other entity that 
promises to systematize and simplify the hypothetical mechanism; even 
though this entity be pretty remote from what is observable. This sort of 
theoretical utility or promise, then, is what we should assess when we 
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allow a mentalistic term to stray very far from the control of behavioral 
criteria.8 (1980c, item 2999, my transcription) 
 
 
4. Token physicalism, type dualism 
 
I have shown that Quine is not a logical behaviorist, i.e. that he rejects the claim that 
mental terms are acceptable only if statements about the mental can be reduced to 
statements about behavior. This does not imply, however, that Quine believes that we 
do require mental terms in our theorizing. Indeed, considering Quine’s claim that 
mental terms are acceptable if they ‘contribute to the coherence and simplicity of an 
inclusive theory for which there is observational support as a whole’, we still need to 
answer the question whether or not mental terms in fact ‘systematize and simplify’ our 
theory of the world. 
Perhaps it will not be a surprise that Quine answers this question negatively. 
After all, Quine is a staunch physicalist—he accepts that “nothing happens in the 
world, not the flutter of an eyelid, not the flicker of a thought, without some 
redistribution of micro-physical states” (1978b, 98). Indeed, on the very first page of 
the Kant lectures, Quine states that his “ontology is physicalist, rather than mentalist, 
from the start”.  From an ontological point of view, this implies that we do not 
quantify over mental entities in our theory of world. Since physicalism implies that 
“[t]here is no change […] without physical change” (1977, 281), we can get rid of 
mental entities by physicalizing them; every mental event can be identified with its 
corresponding bodily event. Or, as Quine expresses it in the Kant Lectures:  
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Dualism with or without interaction is redundant and reducible to a 
physicalistic monism, unless disembodied spirits are assumed. For, the 
dualist who rejects disembodied spirits is bound to agree that for every 
state of mind there is an exactly concurrent and readily specifiable state of 
the accompanying body. Readily specifiable certainly; the bodily state is 
specifiable simply as the state of accompanying a mind that is in that 
mental state. But then we can settle for the bodily states outright, by 
bypassing the mental states in terms of which I specified them. We can just 
reinterpret the mentalistic terms as denoting these correlated bodily states, 
and who is to know the difference? (IKL, 2) 
 
Quine, in other words, does not need the mental in his theory of the world because 
mental states can simply be identified with bodily states.9  
It should be noted, however, that although individual mental states are 
ontologically equated with individual bodily states, we can only specify these bodily 
states in mental terms: “[t]he bodily state corresponding to a mental one [is] only 
specified by reference to the mental state” (p. 3). Every time I think about Vienna, to 
use one of Quine’s own examples, there is a corresponding bodily state; but it is 
probably impossible to find a distinct physical mechanism M such that M is present if 
and only if I am thinking about Vienna. This implies that mentalistic descriptions 
(‘thinking about Vienna’) are practically indispensable for everyday life and for social 
science:  
 
The mentalistic predicates, for all their vagueness […] have long 
interacted with one another, engendering age-old strategies for predicting 
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and explaining human action. They complement natural science in their 
incommensurable way, and are indispensable both to the social sciences 
and to our everyday dealings. (1990, 72-3) 
 
Furthermore, the idioms of propositional attitude (e.g. ‘x believes that p’) are also 
practically indispensable for the process of language learning. In “States of Mind” 
(which is based on the first lecture of the Kant Lectures), Quine argues: 
 
Take the observation sentence ‘It’s raining’. Tom is learning it from 
Martha by ostension. Martha’s business is to encourage Tom in uttering 
the sentence, or in assenting to it, when she sees that he is noticing 
appropriate phenomena, and to discourage him otherwise. Thus Tom’s 
mastery of the physicalistic sentence ‘It’s raining’ hinges on Martha’s 
mastery, virtual if not literal, of the mentalistic sentence ‘Tom perceives 
that it is raining’ […] The handing down of language is thus implemented 
by a continuing command, tacit at least, of the idiom ‘x perceives that p’. 
(1985, 325-6) 
 
Quine’s physicalism, in sum, is non-reductionistic. In the Kant Lectures, Quine cites 
Donald Davidson in describing his view as an “anomalous monism” and Daniel 
Dennett in claiming that his view combines “token physicalism” with “type 
dualism”.10 Quine’s physicalism is “not a reductionist doctrine of the sort sometimes 
imagined […] the groupings of events in mentalistic terms need not stand in any 
systematic relation to biological groupings”; Quine’s physicalism only entails that 




5. The symptomatology of psychophysiology 
  
Let me sum up what we have established thus far.  I have argued that Quine is not a 
logical behaviorist. Quine does not claim that mental statements are acceptable if and 
only if they can be reduced to behavioral statements; he maintains that mental 
statements are acceptable if and only if they contribute to our overall theory of the 
world. In response to the question whether mental statements do contribute to our 
overall theory of the world, however, Quine’s answer is negative. Although he admits 
that mental terms are practically indispensable because there are “irreducibly mental 
ways of grouping physical states and events” (1990, 72), his ontology is strictly 
physicalistic; because there is no change without physical change, we do not have to 
admit mental terms when we are “limning the true and ultimate structure of reality” 
(1960, 221). 
Quine, in sum, rejects mentalism on an ontological level; our comprehensive 
theory of the world, if properly regimented, does not ontologically commit us to the 
existence of mental entities. But is this enough to qualify Quine as a behaviorist in 
psychology? In this final section, I will turn to the third type of behaviorism to answer 
this question: Skinner’s epistemological behaviorism. 
 Thus far, Quine’s account seems to be compatible with Skinner’s. Skinner, 
like Quine, rejects logical behaviorism and combines a strictly physicalistic ontology 
with a distinction between private and public processes. Where Quine dismisses 
Hempel’s positivist strictures on definition, Skinner rejects logical behaviorism by 
dismissing Bridgman’s operationalist perspective (1945, 1984). 11  Most striking, 
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however, is the similarity between Skinner’s and Quine’s views about the ontogeny of 
mental terms. Where Quine argues that we learn to apply mental terms to private 
events “by extrapolation along similarity lines” (IKL, 14-5), Skinner argues that 
“verbal responses which are acquired with respect to public events may be transferred 
to private events on the basis of common properties” (1953, 259). Both Skinner and 
Quine, in other words, argue that our mental terms go beyond publicly observable 
behavior because we extrapolate along private channels.  
But what about the most radical element of Skinner’s behaviorism; what about 
the view that mental entities are explanatorily redundant? Again, there are good 
reasons to suppose that Quine’s and Skinner’s views are compatible. Skinner, we 
have seen, argues that we cannot genuinely explain behavior by referring to mental 
states: to say that Ahmed is eating an apple because he is hungry is merely to offer a 
redundant redescription: “A single set of facts is described by two statements: ‘He 
eats’ and ‘He is hungry’” (Skinner 1953, 31). Quine seems sympathetic to Skinner’s 
line of reasoning. For, in dismissing traditional theories of meaning, he uses almost 
the exact same argument: if we appeal to ‘meanings’ in explaining why we 
understand certain expressions, we are merely offering a “spurious explanation”: 
 
Meanings […] purport to be entities of a special sort: the meaning of an 
expression is the idea expressed. […] The evil of the idea idea is that its 
use, like the appeal in Molière to a virtus dormitiva, engenders an illusion 
of having explained something. (1951b, 48) 
 
When we posit a virtus dormitiva, we do not explain the sleep-inducing quality of 
opium, when we say that someone is hungry, we do not explain his eating behavior, 
and when we posit a meaning, we do not explain why we understand an expression.12  
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Despite these similarities, however, it would be mistake to classify Quine as an 
epistemological behaviorist. For although Quine and Skinner appeal to similar 
arguments in dismissing mentalism and logical behaviorism, they do not agree about 
the types of explanations that psychologists should seek. Quine, unlike Skinner, does 
not believe that behavior is ultimately explained by reinforcement histories. Like many 
of his colleagues in philosophy and psychology departments after the 1970s, Quine 
believes that behavior ultimately requires a neural explanation: 
  
Behavi[o]rism, mine anyway, does not say that the mental states and 
events consist of observable behavi[o]r, nor that they are explained by 
behavi[o]r. They are manifested by behavi[o]r. Neurology is the place for 
the explanations, ultimately. But it is in terms of outward behavior that we 
specify what we want explained. (1978a, 10-1) 
 
The importance of behaviorism is its insistence on shoring up mentalistic 
terms, where possible, by forging substantial links with observation. For a 
deep causal explanation of mental states and events, on the other hand, we 
must look not just to behavior but to neurology. (1980a, 26) 
 
Behavior calls for explanation. And the explanation is going to be in the 
nervous system. It’s going to be physiological. But the behaviorism goes 
in, in stating the problem that we are trying to solve. (1998, 94) 
 
Quine, in other words, distinguishes between three domains in his philosophy of 
psychology: the mental, the behavioral, and the physiological.13 In talking about our 
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actions we often appeal to mental explanations; Paul cries because he has a toothache 
and Ahmed is eating an apple because he is hungry. The behavioral level specifies 
what needs to be explained: Paul’s crying and Ahmed’s eating. The physiological 
level, finally, offers the most fundamental explanation; the things, events, and 
processes referred to are ultimately states of nerves.  
 
a mental state is a state of nerves, whether or not the neural mechanism is 
understood. Coming to understand that mechanism is what constitutes full 
explanation of the mental set, or event; and coming to understand the 
neural mechanism is likewise what constitutes full explanation of the 
behavior that manifests that mental state or event. (1980c, item 2999, my 
transcription) 
 
In clarifying his view, Quine often compares mental states to diseases. Both mental 
states and diseases are recognized in terms of publicly observable symptoms; we know 
that Ahmed is hungry because he is eating and we know that Anne has jaundice 
because her skin looks yellow. Even if we know the physiological cause of the 
symptoms, we often keep specifying mental states and diseases in terms of its public 
and private symptoms. Ultimately, however, the symptoms require physiological 
explanations, even if in some cases we discover that there is no underlying 
physiological explanation at all:  
 
Mental states are like diseases. A disease may be diagnosed in the light of 
its observable signs though the guilty germ be still unknown to science. 
Incidentally, diagnosis depends heavily on symptoms reported by the 
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patient; and such is the way, overwhelmingly, with the detection of mental 
states […] In some cases a supposed disease has been ascribed, such as the 
vapors, that does not really qualify as a disease at all, there being no one 
germ or other uniform causal mechanism behind it. Now much the same is 
true of mental states. Often they are wrongly ascribed on inadequate 
evidence, such as false testimony, and sometimes a supposed mental state 
is ascribed that does not qualify for physicalism as a state at all. (IKL, 5-6) 
 
The behavioral level, in sum, is the level at which mental states are identified⎯mental 
states that are ultimately equated with psychophysiological processes. As a result, 
Quine does not see “behaviorism as an alternative to psychophysiology” he sees it “as 
the symptomatology of psychophysiology” (1983, item 2851, my transcription and 
emphasis).14  
Still, we should not conclude that there are no explanations at the behavioral 
level. Quine grants that Skinner is right that we might find regularities on the 
behavioral level as well.  
 
Is this all we can say for behaviorism, and must all theory be left to the 
neurologist? Certainly not, as Skinner has long stressed. There is strong 
theoretical reason for shortcutting the neural wellsprings and seeking laws 
or uniformities within the behavioral level. The reason is that the 
uniformities and significant correlations in psychology have to do with the 
function or outcome of an animal’s movements, and are insensitive to 
differences in the anatomical details of the movements as long as they 
serve the same end. Running the maze is the thing, and no matter which 
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muscles are flexed in what order, or which neurons are fired to flex them. 
Attention to the anatomical detail of implementation would be 
counterproductive, obstructing the explanatory generalities and obscuring 
the woods with trees. (1989a, 348) 
 
What we see here is another instance of Quine’s anomalous monism. Because there 
are ‘irreducibly mental ways of grouping physical states and events’, we will not be 
able to find neurological explanations for all types of behavior. Often, behavior is 
classified functionally and we will require functional explanations if we want to justice 
to those classifications: 
 
an explanation—not the deepest one, but one of a shallower kind—is 
possible at the purest behavioral level. One can hope to find, and I think 
one does find, behavioral regularities. In economics, for instance, you can 
formulate the concept of unemployment without reducing the phenomenon 
of economics to the behavior of individual people, which would be 
unproductive and chaotic. The instructive regularities occur at another 





Let me, in conclusion, return to the question whether Quine can be classified as 
behaviorist in psychology. I have argued that Quine’s position is surprisingly subtle. 
On the one hand, he believes that there are interesting explanations at the behavioral 
level, especially when we want to explain functionally clustered types of behavior. He 
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even goes as far as to state that in psychology instructive regularities occur at the 
behavioral level. On the other hand, however, Quine denies that behavior is ultimately 
explained in terms of reinforcement histories. Ultimately, mental states are physical 
states. Explanations at the behavioral level are merely ‘shallow’ explanations; we do 
not require such explanations when we are ‘limning the true and ultimate structure of 
reality’. 
 If we take into account these subtleties, it is perhaps not surprising that Quine 
almost always qualifies his views when he uses the term ‘behaviorism’. He speaks 
about “moderate behaviorism” (1980a, 26), about  “behaviorism, in the form in which 
I find it acceptable” (1983, item 2851, my transcription) and about his “very 
moderate, and I would say […] very reasonable behaviorism” (1998, 94). 
Furthermore, in private correspondence, Quine also admits that his behaviorism is 
“pretty moderate” (1980b, item 1004) and that he “perhaps […] never qualified as a 
behaviorist” in the first place (1989b, item 177, my transcription).15   
One thing Quine and the psychological behaviorists definitely have in 
common is their staunch rejection of mentalism. Still, even here Quine’s views are 
subtler than his critics make him out to be: Quine’s anti-mentalism does not imply 
that we do not require mental talk in everyday life and in the social sciences, that we 
cannot, to some extent, meaningfully talk about private events, or that all mental 
statements can be reduced to physical statements. Quine accepts that mental states are 
practically irreducible, that mental terms can be ‘extrapolated along private channels’, 
and that there are ‘irreducibly mental ways of grouping physical states and events’. 
Mental states, in sum, are a mixed bag; some of them are well understood 
physiologically, some of them can only be identified by their outward symptoms, and 
some, as we will probably discover in the near future, do not refer to a uniform 
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1 See Quine (1959, 163): “If ideas did exist we’d have to disregard them”; (1970, 4): 
“A language is mastered through social emulation and social feedback, and these 
controls ignore any idiosyncrasy in an individual’s imagery or associations that is not 
discovered in his behavior”; and (1999, 417): “my linguistic behaviorism […] 
disciplines data”. For an overview of Quine’s linguistic behaviorism, see Gibson 
(2004), Roth (2006), and Føllesdal (2011).  
2 Methodological behaviorists have offered a wide range of objections against the 
study of mental states, processes, and images: they have argued that introspective data 
is subjective, that introspective experiments cannot be replicated, that the connection 
between private events and verbal behavior is unreliable, and that theories based on 
introspective data cannot be falsified. See, for example, Guthrie (1950, 99): “what 
appeals to me as the outstanding aim and the requirement of science [is] its public 
character—its foundation in human communication, not merely in the private 
experience of individuals. Scientific observations must be repeatable by others—there 
can be no science until there are men using a common language”. 
3  John B. Watson, for example, defends a combination of methodological and 
ontological behaviorism. In “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views it”, for instance, 
Watson argues both that introspection is unreliable and that “thought processes are 
really motor habits in the larynx” (1913, 177). B. F. Skinner’s “radical behaviorism”, 
on the other hand, combines an epistemological argument against mentalism with a 
functional analysis of behavior. See Zuriff (1985) and Graham (2015) for taxonomies 
of behaviorism that are more closely aligned with positions that have been actually 
defended by twentieth-century psychologists.  
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4 Of course, Carl Hempel (and many other logical positivists) would later abandon the 
translationist view summarized here. See section 3. 
5 Carnap (1936, §8) characterizes partial definitions as follows. Let Q3 be a mental 
predicate, let Q1 and Q4 describe experimental conditions which have to obtain in 
order to find out whether or not Q3 applies, and let Q2 and Q5 describe possible results 
of the experiments. Then Q3 can be introduced as a new predicate in one’s language 
by statements like R1 and R2:    
 
(R1)  Q1 → (Q2 → Q3)   
(R2)  Q4 → (Q5 → ¬Q3)   
 
Definitions of this form are partial definitions because Q3 is only specified relative to 
a set of experimental conditions Q1 and Q4. See Verhaegh (2014; 2018, section 2.2). 
6 It is probably for this reason that both Carnap and Hempel would later also abandon 
partial definitions. See Hempel (1952, 32) and Carnap (1956, 68). Again, see 
Verhaegh (2014; 2018, section 2.2). Indeed, in a third reprint of “The Logical 
Analysis of Psychology”, Hempel admits that even his weakened version of logical 
behaviorism is too strong: “Since then, I have come to think that this conception 
requires still further broadening, and that the introduction and application of 
psychological terms and hypotheses is logically and methodologically analogous to 
the introduction and application of the terms and hypotheses of a physical theory” 
(1980, 14).  
7 See also Quine’s Calcutta Lectures (1983), written a few years after the Kant 
Lectures: “Full operational definition of terms is not […] to be demanded, even for 
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rigorous science; but if a term is seriously deficient on that score, then it needs to 
justify itself by contributing theoretically to the systematic explanation of observed 
events. Such was the contribution of the notion of molecules in explaining the 
behavior of gases by the mechanics of moving particles” (item 2851, my 
transcription). 
8 In the Kant Lectures, Quine makes the same point without explicitly referring to 
mental terms: “Empiricism or positivism at its radical extreme would aspire to a 
completely operational lexicon. The reasonable line rather is one that plays two values 
one against the other. There is a premium on perceptual criteria: the fuller the better, 
other things being equal. But there is also a premium on structural simplicity and the 
other related qualities, whatever they are, that make for a satisfactorily explanatory 
scientific theory. A term that promises well in this latter way can be excused its 
remoteness from perceptual criteria. A judicious weighing of these two values is what 
is called for” (IKL, 19). 
9 This argument goes back to beginning of Quine’s philosophical career. Indeed, in the 
early 1950s, Quine already claimed that a “physicalist ontology has a place also for 
states of mind” because any “inspiration or a hallucination can […] be identified with 
its host for the duration” (1954, 230).  
10 Although Quine adopts Davidson’s label ‘anomalous monism’, the latter’s version 
of the thesis differs from Quine’s in some crucial respects. See Kemp (2012).  
11 For a comparison between verificationism, operationalism, and partial definitions, 
see Zuriff (1985, ch. 3). In the Immanuel Kant Lectures, Quine also characterizes 
logical behaviorism as a type of operationalism: “this extreme of behaviorism would 
be excessively restrictive. It would be as unreasonable as an unswerving insistence in 
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scientific theory on what Bridgman called operational definition. Indeed it would be a 
case of that” (p. 5). 
12 See also Quine (1947, 339-40): “Frege, Carnap, Lewis, and the rest seem to derive 
from those shadowy entities [attributes, propositions, and meanings] the same 
smug illusion of clarity that Toletus did from his substantial forms, and 
Moli[è]re’s physician from the virtus dormitiva”.  
13 Quine first appeals to some such distinction in “Mind and Verbal Dispositions”, 
although he (somewhat misleadingly) speaks about “three levels […] of reduction” 
there (p. 253-254, my emphases). I thank Robert Sinclair for bringing this passage to 
my attention.  
14 After the Immanuel Kant Lectures, Quine often reused the disease analogy. See, for 
example, Quine (1980c, item 2999; 1983, item 2851; 1985; 1994; 1998). It is 
surprising, however, that Quine never credited Putnam for the metaphor. After all, 
Putnam often used the same analogy in arguing for his functionalist philosophy of 
mind. See, for example, Putnam (1957; 1963). 
15 These qualifications start to appear from the late 1970s onwards. This suggests that 
Quine changed his mind on this issue, perhaps even in preparing the Immanuel Kant 
Lectures. For a discussion of the development of Quine’s views on behaviorism, see 
Verhaegh (forthcoming). 
16 An early draft of this paper was presented at the 2018 APA Central Division 
symposium on Quine’s Immanuel Kant Lectures. I thank Robert Sinclair, Gary Ebbs, 
and the audience in Chicago for their valuable comments and suggestions. This 
research is funded by The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO, 
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Kristeller-Popkin Travel Fellowship from the Journal of the History of Philosophy, by 
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